Operation 8

How the Police Watched Us and How They Are Still Watching Us

— Mysterex

Operation 8 was the name of the police operation that resulted in the raids on October 15th 2007. It is the biggest police investigation of political activists in this country for decades and still continues today. Dozens of police spent at least two years and $8 million on the investigation, which has resulted in the police laying charges against 20 defendants.

This article is an attempt to describe briefly how the police investigation progressed. As the case is still before the courts we won't be naming any names or going into details, just describing what methods the police used to monitor activists and gather information. Then we will discuss what we can learn from this and how we can operate more effectively as activists in this new world of constant surveillance and harassment.

The police "terrorism" case against Maori activists and anarchists has its origins long before Operation Eight began. In the 1990s political activists were under surveillance from police intelligence groups based in the main cities. Police in each main city had an intelligence office which (among other things) kept track of radical political activists. Files on individuals were updated regularly and when a large protest or activist event (eg. a conference or gathering) was expected, police would divert resources into surveillance and intelligence gathering for that event, but the number of detectives working fulltime on watching radicals was very small. After the September 11 terror attacks in New York, everything changed.

In January 2002, the Labour government approved new anti-terrorism legislation, and new "operational capabilities." The result was the Terrorism Suppression Act and, more importantly, a range of new anti-terrorism forces. The police created: a position of assistant commissioner for counter-terrorism; a 12-person anti-terrorism Strategic Intelligence Unit at police headquarters; a fulltime commando-style Special Tactics Group specialising in terrorism; and police liaison officers in Washington and London to channel anti-terrorism ideas and intelligence to New Zealand. An extra 35 "national security" police posts were added in 2004, the majority in "investigative and intelligence" units.

The Security Intelligence Service also got 20 new anti-terrorism staff at that time. Their task: increasing terrorism intelligence collection within New Zealand. They provided more field intelligence officers, especially in Auckland, an enlarged surveillance team and new analysts at headquarters. New interception and photographic equipment cost $1 million and, like the police, an SIS officer was posted to the Washington embassy to increase collaboration with the US intelligence and security agencies. The overall SIS budget has more than doubled in the last five years.

So, we had lots of police and SIS staff all employed fulltime to find terrorists in New Zealand. Only trouble is, there weren't any. So they started looking for people who they thought might be terrorists. First they tried Ahmed Zaoui, throwing him in jail (without any evidence or charges) and eventually admitting five years after that he wasn't a threat after all. They also appeared to be looking closely at animal rights activists, anarchists and anti war activists. Court documents reveal the police counter-terrorism assistant commissioner Jon White was directly involved in planning the police response to anti war protests in Wellington. Animal rights activists in Auckland were harassed and raided by members of the Auckland police Threat Assessment Unit, the same police officers who would later be involved in Operation 8.

. . . . .

We don't yet know all the details of when and how Operation 8 started, but for various reasons, police started following several Auckland activists in September 2006. Police were investigating a computer hacking incident against a political party website and decided that several people were going to threaten the Prime Minister. All of the suspects were also known to be supportive of Maori sovereignty issues.

Police from the Threat Assessment Unit eventually started paying serious attention to an Auckland activist. They followed him around over the course of several weeks to identify his house, place of work and the addresses of his associates. A detective phoned his workplace in order to obtain his cellphone numbers. They checked the power and phone company records in order to obtain the names of his flatmates. In November 2006, police were following the Auckland activist around and observing him shopping. After he left shops they entered and asked the shopkeepers about his spending habits, how often he shops, etc. Police also observed him driving around Auckland and visiting other addresses. They checked the power and phone company records of those addresses and obtained more names.

At this stage the police decided that the suspect might be meeting with others for a 'training camp' in the Ureweras. They decided to put a lot more effort into discovering what was going on and who else might be attending. A surveillance team was deployed into the forest to try to observe suspects at the alleged 'camp.'

Police also obtained search warrants so that Westpac and Kiwibank turned over full bank account records for several suspects. Warrants were served on Telecom and Vodafone so police could obtain full records of phone numbers, including the names of account holders, how often suspects rang certain numbers etc, all to build up a pattern of who associated with whom, and how well they knew each other.

Police also began obtaining records of text messages from the phone companies. This became a major part of the operation. Both Telecom and Vodafone store the contents of all text messages sent and received, and thousands of text messages were copied and supplied to the Police. Sifting through this information took months and months but gave police a lot of information about the suspects and their associates. Police suspected that a lot of people were attending "training camps" in the Ureweras, so attempted to identify everyone involved.

They did this by analysing the text messages. Police officers trawled through months of text messages sent and received by suspects and used these messages to identify everyone the suspects were in contact with. Police traced all the phone numbers that were in contact with the phones of the first suspects. Some were easily identified because the owner had given their names to the telephone company when they bought the phone. Others were identified because police read all their other texts and found names and home addresses in the text of the messages. Others were a bit harder to trace but police went to great lengths to identify the owners of these phones in order to arrest them.

For example, to identify the person who used one number, police went through all the messages sent and received by that number, until they found one signed "From Dad." Then they traced that number, identified the owner, and checked government birth records to identify his children and then traced their addresses.

Another person was identified because the address supplied to Vodafone when the cellphone was bought seven years ago was linked in the police computer to an activist. A search of the police intelligence computer showed that the activist's name also showed up in the memories of two mobile phones seized in an unrelated case. This confirmed the identity and that person was raided on October 15th as police could prove that the person received a text message.

In one case, police Googled a phone number and found a suspect's CV on the internet.

One woman was identified because her first name was used in a text message. Police had previously come across a person with the same first name, so checked the records of her landline. They found that phones belonging to other suspects had frequently called her number. She ended up spending a month in jail.

One suspect was only identified because several months earlier he had invited someone over to his house and included his full name and home address in the text message.

Physical surveillance of Auckland activists continued. When two suspects met at a cafe, again, a plainclothes detective sat at the next table and listened in on the conversation. Some police information was also received from informants, but we don't know the details of this yet.

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In January 2007, Auckland activists were followed by car and on foot again, and one was observed shopping, and picking up passengers before driving for several hours to Whakatane where police observed him meeting up with other known activists who were also under surveillance. Police suspected another "training camp" so deployed police officers in the forest to observe the goings on all weekend. Hidden cameras were also installed overlooking bush tracks and roads so that suspects and their cars could be photographed.

Back at the head office, police continued analysing phone records as they came in each week from Telecom and Vodafone. Any names they found through phone records or car registrations were checked with police records, power company records and Internal Affairs (birth certificates, etc.) so that current home addresses could be identified. Some suspects were already on the police computer as well known protest organisers. One person was identified because he had previously given his cellphone number to Internal Affairs when applying for a passport. Another person was identified because a phone number discovered during the investigation was given to police a year earlier when the person made a burglary complaint.

It's also very important to note that each text message sent also includes information identifying the phone handset (not just the SIM card) used, and the location of the cellphone towers nearest the sender and receiver of the message. So police were able to place suspects in certain towns on the dates they sent messages. One suspect changed his SIM card and phone number halfway through the surveillance but police could tell it was still him as he used the new SIM card in the same phone handset.

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By February 2007 police had obtained warrants to listen in on the phone calls of several suspects living around the North Island (up until this point they had not been listening, merely going through text message records). In March they obtained a warrant to put a listening device into the car of an Auckland suspect. The listening device recorded information which the police had to retrieve every few weeks or so, possibly by physically changing a tape or memory stick. It's likely that a tracking device was put into the car at the same time.

In April detectives followed this car and observed as it travelled around Auckland and on to Whakatane. At this stage surveillance cameras in the Bay of Plenty photographed a car linked to a Wellington activist, and text message analysis identified more suspects. Another person was identified because his cellphone was reported missing to the police several years ago and police therefore had a record linking his name to that phone number.

In June 2007 police had also intercepted and recorded conversations inside houses of activists and had installed a covert camera outside the house of an Auckland activist that photographed him and everyone else that went through his front gate.

Warrants were obtained under the Terrorism Suppression Act to place recording devices in two huts in the bush in the Ureweras. Police also attempted to install covert video cameras but these apparently failed.

One activist in a small town in the North Island was followed from his house and watched while he made a call at a public payphone. Phone records were checked and police discovered the call was to the workplace of another suspect.

Meanwhile our Auckland activist was still under surveillance as he prepared for another trip south. The covert camera photographed him as he left his front door and packed bags into his car. A police team followed him as he drove around Auckland doing his shopping for the trip and picking up passengers. The car was then observed by waiting police as it passed through several towns in the central North Island. And of course all the conversations inside the car were being recorded for police to retrieve at a later date. Police also had several other addresses around the North Island under surveillance in case the occupants were travelling to the Bay of Plenty that day. At the alleged training camp that weekend, video cameras filmed people entering and leaving the bush, and conversations inside the bush huts were recorded by bugging devices. After the camp, police entered the huts to retrieve the recording devices.

By this time more suspects had been identified and were placed under surveillance. Another Auckland activist was observed by a team of police for an entire day as he met a friend at a kebab shop, went to post some mail, visited an internet café and then returned to his house.

On July 6th, Wellington police were outside the 128 Community house photographing suspects and vehicles as people entered and left the building. In August, police were again watching 128 and followed a car as it picked up passengers around Wellington and as it drove to Palmerston North and on to the Bay of Plenty. On the same day, police in Auckland and Hamilton were also following cars as they left for the Bay of Plenty. As cars arrived, covert cameras recorded the occupants and the registration numbers of everyone who used that road.

At least three activists had made separate overseas trips and were watched as they returned to New Zealand. One suspect was under surveillance as he came into Auckland airport. Police asked customs to do a 'random search' and obtain details of who was picking him up from the airport. He was then followed as he left and the registration of the car that met him was recorded. Air New Zealand kindly supplied the detective with the suspect's ticket details as well. An anarchist flew into Wellington airport from overseas. Police were there to see who picked her up and followed the car to 128. Another activist was photographed as he arrived at an airport as police wanted to prove his backpack looked like one that was allegedly worn at a 'training camp'

An Auckland activist moved house at this point, and police were there to confirm his new address. A car used by a Wellington anarchist was towed from outside their house for no reason. Unknown to the car's owner, police had installed a listening device in the car before it was returned the next day. Another Wellington activist was followed from her home to a railway station and observed catching a bus. Police were waiting at the Taupo bus terminal and watched her get on the Rotorua bus. In Rotorua police were waiting again and photographed her and the person who picked her up, then followed the car to see where she was going.

Police suspected a 'training camp' was going to take place in September so again, addresses of suspects all over the North Island were under surveillance by teams of police ready to follow cars all over the North Island. Bank records were obtained to show where suspects used their bankcards in order to identify where they where on those dates.

By this stage police had convinced themselves that up to 50 people had been taking part in 'terrorist training camps' in preparation for an armed uprising and the assassination of politicians (including George Bush!).

. . . . .

On Monday, October 15th 2007, more than 300 police carried out dawn raids on dozens of houses all over Aotearoa / New Zealand. Police claim the raids were in response to 'concrete terrorist threats' from indigenous activists. The reality, however, included heavily armed police terrorising an entire township. To date, no evidence of the so-called terrorist plot has been revealed.

Police arrested 17 indigenous, anarchist, environmental and anti-war activists, including people from Tuhoe, Te Atiawa, Maniopoto, Nga Puhi and Pakeha. Police wanted to charge 12 people under the Terrorism Suppression Act (TSA), however the Solicitor-General denied the police permission to proceed. After four weeks in jail everyone was released on bail.

During the raids, police seized dozens of computers and cellphones (containing details identifying more phone numbers and names) and questioned more suspects and their friends and relatives. Unfortunately, some of these people (including some who definitely should have known better) have made statements to the police, which have been used to identify and harass more people. Police would also have listened to phone conversations and watched the reaction as news spread of the raids, and as activists planned solidarity and support for the arrestees.

On Tuesday, February 19th 2007, police raided further properties, arresting three more men. All were released on bail with strict conditions that same day. Twenty people are facing charges under the Arms Act, in a trial that could take several years. Although out of jail, they have very strict bail conditions that deny them freedom of movement and association.

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Operation 8 is still ongoing. The police are still listening in on your phone calls and reading your text messages. They are still bugging cars, phones and houses connected with Maori and anarchist activists. Unfortunately it doesn't end with Operation 8.

The reality we have to face is that anyone involved in radical politics or direct action should expect to be under surveillance. Dozens of detectives are now employed fulltime in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and other towns, to monitor 'potential terrorists,' which means Tino Rangatiratanga activists, anarchists, socialists, radical environmentalists and animal rights activists. In fact, pretty much anyone who disagrees with the system and is working towards real change, especially if it involves direct action of any sort.

Corporate intelligence is also an issue. Any campaign (no matter how moderate) directed at hurting the profits or reputation of a large company should expect to be monitored or infiltrated by private investigators. We have all heard of the Thompson & Clark Investigations who put spies into activist groups in Christchurch and Wellington, but there are dozens of other corporate security and intelligence firms operating in New Zealand.

We are being watched because they consider us to be a threat. We need to stop underestimating ourselves. Too often, local activists are lazy because they think nobody is bothered by our activities. The state and corporations are extremely bothered by our campaigns and movements. Not all of them and not all the time, but they are worried, and they do put a big effort into watching us. We should see Operation 8 as a wake up call.

Being put under surveillance is now a fact of life for the political activist. It is actually a sign that you are being taken seriously so it is not always something to be too concerned about. It is certainly not being paranoid to think it could never happen. It does, and much more regularly than is supposed, though not often in a systematic manner.

All activists, and even individuals only connected on the periphery of a group or campaign, will be watched at some stage, including active surveillance of their lives. The main purpose in doing this is to build up a profile on people so there is at least a basic file on you (e.g. name and up-to-date address to go with a photograph) and so they have a good idea how you fit into the organisation or group they are targeting. And also whether you are worth a closer look (a reason would be hanging out with other activists who are known to be involved in covert actions or organising). High profile activists, especially outspoken ones, will be under regular surveillance as a matter of routine. Most others will have periodic surveillance as the State seek to update their intelligence and profiles. The mistake is to think that surveillance only happens prior to actions or arrests.

We need to be much more security conscious than we have been. And this means everyone involved in radical political campaigns or groups, even if you don't think you are doing anything dodgy or illegal. We need to stay active and stay safe. There's no perfect way to do this but we should be thinking about security precautions in everything we do.

As a bare minimum, everyone in our movements/groups should:

More generally we should be making it difficult for police to gain information on our movements. If the police raided your house today, what would they find? Do we really need to keep a list of names and phone numbers on a piece of paper next to the phone. Does your diary have details of every meeting and protest you went to this year recorded in it? Do you keep sensitive information on your computer? Have you got encryption software like PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) so you can communicate securely by email? Do we really need to have that Facebook or Myspace page with our real names, contact details, political opinions and links to all our friends publicly available on the internet for all to see.

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Activist groups and campaigns should discuss security as a group and plan how to minimize the effects of surveillance, spies and police harassment. Everyone involved should take part in this discussion, from veterans to new volunteers, and the discussion needs to be ongoing. Mailing list databases and other sensitive information should ideally be encrypted and kept in a secure location. Group offices should be secure and not open to random strangers to come in and access everything. Contact lists should not be left lying around after meetings. And, we should discuss the difficult issue of dealing with infiltrators and spies. Activists in Christchurch and Wellington have found corporate spies in their groups and it will happen again.

This article is aimed at showing how much effort the police are putting into watching us, and starting a conversation on how we can minimise the effects of this. We should all start talking about this in our groups as it's going to be an ongoing reality for all of us.

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